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Abstract. A strong link between citizen preferences and public policy is one of the key goals and criteria of
democratic governance. Yet, our knowledge about the extent to which public policies on speciic issues are
in line with citizen preferences in Europe is limited. This article reports on the irst study of the link between
public opinion and public policy that covers a large and diverse sample of concrete public policy issues in
31 European democracies. The indings demonstrate a strong positive relationship and a substantial degree
of congruence between public opinion and the state of public policy. Also examined is whether political
institutions, including electoral systems and the horizontal and vertical division of powers, inluence the
opinion-policy link. The evidence for such effects is very limited, which suggests that the same institutions
might affect policy representation in countervailing ways through different mechanisms.
Keywords: policy representation; policy congruence; policy responsiveness; public opinion; institutions
Introduction
It is a deining feature of any liberal and democratic political system that policy relects the
will of the people (see, e.g., Dahl 1956; Pitkin 1967; Przeworski 2010). The match between
public preferences and public policy cannot be expected to be perfect and instantaneous. In
some cases – for example, when it comes to possible infringements of fundamental human
rights or the repression of minorities – it might not even be normatively desirable.However,
no political system that allows for gross, sustained and systematic differences between what
the public wants and what policies the government delivers can be considered liberal and
democratic (cf. Rehfeld 2009: 214).
Therefore, it is important to assess how strong the link between public opinion and
public policy is in order to obtain a comprehensive and nuanced picture of the quality of
democracy in Europe. Yet, our knowledge about the link between public opinion and the
public policies in place across European democracies is still limited. Previous studies have
investigated a large number of countries but along very general dimensions, like left-right
(Powell 2006; Golder & Stramski 2010; Blais & Bodet 2006; Golder & Lloyd 2014; Ferland
2016), government spending (Wlezien & Soroka 2012) or broad policy areas (Hobolt &
Klemmensen 2008; Soroka & Wlezien 2010). We contribute to this literature with a study
of the link between public opinion and policy that simultaneously includes a large number
of European countries, uses data on concrete policy outcomes and covers a relatively large
number of different policy areas. Speciically,we compare public opinion towards 20 speciic
policy issues with the status of these policies in 31 European countries in a cross-sectional
design. Instead of relying on aggregate or indirect measures of policy, we determine the
actual state of policy for speciic policy issues within broader policy domains in each country.
This approach has the advantage of not requiring the assumption that citizens’ policy
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preferences neatly map onto a single dimension, such as left-right or liberalism (Converse
1964;Lax & Phillips 2012), and allows us to measure opinion and policy on the same speciic
issues (Berry et al. 1993; Lax & Phillips 2012;Wlezien 2017).
The second aim of this study is to examine whether the opinion-policy link varies
with some of the political institutions that differentiate the political systems found across
Europe. It is widely believed that political institutions can fundamentally affect the quality
of democratic governance.Yet, in many cases, opposing theoretical expectations exist about
the nature and direction of an institution’s inluence. For instance, electoral systems with
proportional representation (PR) rules are more likely to producemulti-party governments,
which can make legislating in line with public opinion dificult (Wlezien & Soroka 2012;
Jones et al. 2009; Coman 2015). At the same time, governments in majoritarian systems
might not always have the incentives to follow the median voter either (Persson & Tabellini
2004; Hobolt & Klemmensen 2008;Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002).
Similarly, the horizontal separation of powers embodied in institutions like bicameralism
or rules allocating considerable discretion to the executive vis-à-vis the legislature may
inluence the opinion-policy nexus in contingent ways, which do not make them generally
better or worse at producing a strong link between opinion and policy. On the one
hand, veto players can act as safeguards to protect the public from policies that only
serve a minority (Wlezien & Soroka 2012). On the other hand, they can also prevent
governments from enacting policies that are congruent with public opinion (Tsebelis
1995; Hobolt & Klemmensen 2008). Hence, the provisional conclusion that emerges from
the theoretical predictions of the existing literature, as well as the empirical indings, is
that institutions can steer policy simultaneously towards and away from public opinion.
Therefore, rather than arguing that speciic institutions affect congruence in a single
direction, we suggest that countries with different institutional set-ups may exhibit little to
no net systematic differences in the strength of the relationship and congruence between
opinion and policy. The exception is the vertical separation of powers through multilevel
government in federalist systems and European Union member states,where a lower clarity
of responsibility might lead to public opinion being less well relected in policy (Wlezien &
Soroka 2012).
Our sample of 31 countries features signiicant variation along this set of institutional
dimensions, while the 20 policy issues are of differing salience and from various policy types
and areas. This allows us to explore the potential impact of institutions on a diverse set
of issues, extending previous research examining the association between institutions and
the opinion-policy link among a small number of countries (Hobolt & Klemmensen 2008),
among many countries but with respect to overall government spending (Wlezien & Soroka
2012) or at the subnational level (Lax & Phillips 2012).
We ind a strong and statistically signiicant positive relationship between public support
for a policy and the likelihood that the policy is in place. Moreover, in two-thirds of the
cases, we observe that policy is congruent with the opinion of the majority of citizens.
Thus, the opinion-policy link and level of congruence observed in the European countries
are not perfect, yet relatively high compared to the American states (cf. Lax & Phillips
2012). At the same time, we ind no association between the two aspects of the opinion-
policy linkage that we study and any of the institutional features we analyse, apart from
the number of chambers in parliament. We are led to conclude that the different and often
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opposing ways in which electoral systems, the horizontal division of powers and the vertical
separation of powers can be expected to affect policy representation may cancel out in the
aggregate.The study thus contributeswith new empirical insights to the debate on the impact
of political institutions on the opinion-policy linkage and the quality of democracy more
generally.
The opinion-policy nexus
Due to the centrality of the link between public opinion and policy to the core concept
of representative democracy, a range of studies have used multiple approaches and data
sources to examine it. They have investigated how closely public opinion matches different
indicators of public policy, such as the degree of policy liberalism, government agendas,
budgetary spending or speciic policy issues (e.g., Page & Shapiro 1983; Erikson et al. 1993;
Wlezien 1995;Monroe 1998;Jones et al.2009;Lax&Phillips 2009,2012).The vastmajority of
research on the opinion-policy linkage focuses on single or small numbers of countries (e.g.,
Burstein 2014; Lax & Phillips 2012; Monogan et al. 2009; Stimson et al. 1995; Rasmussen
et al. 2018; Wlezien 1995; Soroka & Wlezien 2004) and often uses aggregate indicators
of policy (Stimson et al. 1995; Erikson et al. 2002) or analyses broad policy areas, such as
labour and employment or defence (e.g., Jennings & John 2009; Wlezien 1995; Bevan &
Rasmussen 2017). Recent years have witnessed an increase in the number of studies that
take a comparative approach, often investigating the role of political institutions. However,
they rely on broader measures of policy than speciic policy issues (e.g., Wlezien & Soroka
2012;Hobolt &Klemmensen 2008;Kang&Powell 2010) or focus on one policy area, such as
immigration or social welfare (e.g., Eichenberg & Stoll 2003; Brooks & Manza 2006; Peters
& Ensink 2014;Morales et al. 2015).
The problem with looking at a single policy area is that we might not be able to
generalise indings about the opinion-policy linkage and the impact of political institutions
and other cross-country differences to other policy areas as they may differ for different
policy domains and issues of varying salience.Meanwhile, the use of broad policy categories
or dimensions does not consider the possibility that the preferences of citizens and political
elites’ over speciic policies within broader policy areas are not necessarily consistent. In
Golder and Ferland’s (2017) words, a ‘strong positive correlation between policy adoption
and state ideology says little about whether implemented policies are congruent with
citizens’ preferences because we do not know how broad measures of state ideology should
be translated into preferences for actual policies’ (cf. also Burstein 2014; Lax & Phillips
2012).
Several studies overcome this problem by comparing public opinion with policy change
or with existing legislation across a range of speciic policy issues. This approach also allows
examining how the opinion-policy linkage varies with issue characteristics. Yet, since these
studies have generally been restricted to a single country (cf. Brettschneider 1996; Brooks
1987, 1990; Burstein 2014; Gilens 2012; Gilens & Page 2014; Lax & Phillips 2012; Monroe
1979, 1998; Page & Shapiro 1983; Petry & Mendelsohn 2004),1 it is dificult to assess the
applicability of their indings in other contexts. In order to simultaneously achieve the aims
of making observations that are – to a certain extent – generalisable across both countries
and issues, and of avoiding a potential mismatch between public opinion and policy, we
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examine variation in the opinion-policy linkage across a large set of speciic policy issues
and a high number of national contexts.
We focus on two aspects of the opinion-policy linkage: the relationship between public
opinion and policy and congruence between them.The former refers to the idea that changes
in public opinion should be relected in corresponding changes in policy. This relationship
is often understood in a dynamic way, with policy being responsive to changes in public
opinion (Achen 1978).Yet, it is equally possible that a high correlation between opinion and
policy exists because citizens have adapted their preferences to information and arguments
provided to them by political elites (Esaiasson & Holmberg 1996; Holmberg 2011). This
conceptual understanding is relected in our methodological design: By examining the
relationship between public opinion and policy measured at the same point in time across
countries,we allow the causality between public opinion and policy to low in both directions.
In addition to the relationship between opinion and policy, we study congruence, which
indicates whether the policy in place has the support of a majority of the population. Both
aspects of policy representation capture important normative intuitions about the concept,
are empirically distinct (Achen 1978), and need to be analysed separately (Lax & Phillips
2012).2
The impact of political institutions
In addition to assessing the link between opinion and policy in Europe, we are interested
in the extent to which, and why, it varies across countries. Political institutions are among
the most prominent factors hypothesised to affect the opinion-policy linkage. The main
institutional characteristics assumed to play a role in existing studies are electoral systems
and the horizontal and vertical separation of powers in a country (Wlezien & Soroka 2012).
While several studies have examined the effects of these institutions, they often conduct
an analysis of policy responsiveness over time for a set of broader policy areas and in a
limited number of countries (Hobolt & Klemmensen 2008; Soroka & Wlezien 2010; see
also Wlezien and Soroka (2012) and Kang and Powell (2010) who cover many countries
but only one dimension of public spending). In addition, several of the studies interested in
assessing the impact of electoral institutions focus on left-right congruence between citizens
and governments rather than on the link between public opinion and policy outputs (e.g.,
Blais & Bodet 2006; Ferland 2016; Golder & Stramski 2010; Golder & Lloyd 2014; Powell
2009).The expectations and indings of these previous studies vary quite substantially,which
is partly due to the different ways in which they conceptualise and measure representation.
We adapt the expectations about the effects of institutions on representation to the opinion-
policy link across a set of concrete policy issues in a cross-national design.
Electoral systems
The impact of electoral institutions on representation has been examined by looking at both
ideological congruence and policy responsiveness. In the past, it was widely believed that
PR systems generate a better match between public opinion and policy than majoritarian
or plurality systems. After all, the system was designed with the aim of achieving a high
level of vote-seat proportionality and, hence, guarantee the representation of as many views
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in society as possible (Lijphart 1984). Yet, while earlier studies provided support for this
expectation (see Huber & Powell 1994; Powell 2000, 2006; McDonald et al. 2004), there is
now widespread agreement that, through different mechanisms and if certain conditions are
met, PR and majoritarian systems generate governments that represent citizens similarly
well (Blais & Bodet 2006; Ferland 2016; Golder & Stramski 2010; Golder & Lloyd 2014;
Powell 2009; see also Golder & Ferland 2017). However, this literature conceptualises and
measures representation in terms of congruence between the left-right positions of citizens
and the government rather than between citizens’ policy preferences and policy outputs
(cf. Kang & Powell 2010), which may be understood as coming later in the ‘chain’ of
representation. While the ideological orientation of the government might be a powerful
predictor of legislation, there are additional mechanisms through which electoral system
characteristics may inluence both the ability and the willingness of governments to change
or maintain policy in line with the wishes of the public (cf. Coman 2015; Golder & Ferland
2017).
An important factor is the policy-making dynamics of multi-party governments, which
are more likely to emerge in PR systems where higher numbers of parties tend to enter
parliament. Government coalitions require compromise (Müller & Strøm 2000). In such
systems, it can be dificult to reach agreement and implement policy that would improve the
representation of the public majority but hurt the constituencies of some coalition partners
(Wlezien & Soroka 2012, 2015). In the words of Jones et al. (2009), coalition governments
increase the ‘institutional friction’ that hinders policy change.Coman (2015) illustrates these
dynamics with the example of spending cuts that are desired by the overall public but whose
burden none of the coalition partners wants their constituencies to bear. But the issue also
pertains to other types of policy where the government parties disagree and use their veto
powers (Tsebelis 1995).
What is more, single-party governments have a higher clarity of responsibility thanmulti-
party governments (Fisher & Hobolt 2010; Powell & Whitten 1993). If citizens can more
easily determine which party is to praise or blame for a policy or its absence, and reward or
punish it at the next election, government parties have a stronger incentive to bring policy in
line with public opinion by adjusting legislation or by convincing the public of their policies.
As a result, one might expect policy to relect public opinion better under majoritarian than
PR rules, even if governments represent the median voter equally well in both systems
(Coman 2015; Golder & Ferland 2017). Support for such a prediction can for example
be found in Wlezien and Soroka’s (2012) work, which demonstrates that electoral system
proportionality has the potential to decrease the strength of the link between spending
preferences and actual spending.
Yet, there are also factors that might weaken the opinion-policy link in majoritarian
systems.Since in single-member district (SMD) systems seat shares are increased bywinning
pluralities in additional districts rather than gaining additional votes in ‘safe seats’, parties
looking for re-election often have an incentive to please voters in a few pivotal districts
rather than the nationwide median voter (Persson & Tabellini 2004;Hobolt & Klemmensen
2008).There is also evidence that SMD systems incentivise politicians to cultivate a personal
rather than a party vote, resulting in representatives catering to the more narrow interest
of their districts rather than those of the national public (Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002).3 In
line with such a view, Hobolt and Klemmensen (2005) found that the government’s policy
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intentions were less responsive to public opinion in the British plurality system than in the
Danish proportional system.
We are thus faced with different and partly opposing arguments for why majoritarian or
PR systems might foster stronger opinion-policy linkages, and it is not entirely clear which
side in the debate assembles more powerful mechanisms. This leaves the option that, in
the aggregate, we may ind no net differences in the strength of the opinion-policy linkage
between the different electoral systems.
Horizontal division of powers
Similar counteracting pressures are likely to exist with regard to the horizontal division
of power between the executive and the legislative branches of government. It may be
easier to adopt policy that relects public opinion in systems where the legislature is more
powerful. Legislatures in parliamentary systems face fewer constraints when passing laws
desired by the public than those in (semi-)presidential systems, in which checks and balances
are generally stronger (Tsebelis 1995). Using a similar argument, Jones et al. (2009) posit
that the requirement that laws enjoy the support of both president and parliament may
be another source of friction hampering the adoption of policy. Particularly – though not
exclusively – in cases where the presidency and the parliament are controlled by different
parties, presidential and semi-presidential systems can experience gridlock (Monroe 1998).
In fact, even parliamentary systems display variation in the division of powers between
legislative and executive (as a result of, for instance, differences in the government’s ability
to inluence the legislative agenda and the degree of parliamentary scrutiny), which may
lead to differences in the opinion-policy link.
However, a strong horizontal division of powers may not only affect the opinion-
policy linkage in a negative manner. Similarly to veto players within government coalitions,
requirements to obtain executive-legislative agreement can affect positively the opinion-
policy linkage by blocking policy changes that are not desired by the public (cf. Hobolt &
Klemmensen 2008). For example, Wlezien and Soroka (2012) ind that weaker executive
discretion strengthens the link between the public’s spending preferences and actual
spending.Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) provide a similar explanation for their inding of
high responsiveness in the United States. Whether a stronger horizontal division of power
weakens or strengthens the opinion-policy link in a speciic case thus likely depends on
whether the public desires a policy change or favours the status quo.With such counteracting
pressures, there might thus be no net effect of the horizontal distribution of power on the
opinion-policy linkage.
A similar argument applies to bicameral and unicameral systems: an upper chamber with
(strong) veto powers can generate ‘friction’ and thwart policy change that is in the interest
of the public (Jones et al. 2009), but it can also prevent unpopular decisions – especially
if the two chambers are controlled by different parties (Tsebelis 1995). Again, whether a
more extensive division of powers is beneicial for stimulating a strong linkage between
opinion and policy is thus contingent on situational factors, providing the possibility that
we ind no net differences in the strength of the opinion-policy link between the different
systems.
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Vertical division of powers
In complex systems of multilevel governance it should be more dificult for voters to assign
responsibility for policy as it is often unclear which government level deals with a particular
issue (see also Jones et al. 2009). This lowers the pressure on governments to respond to
the public’s wishes as they are less likely to be punished for it (Soroka & Wlezien 2004;
Wlezien & Soroka 2012). The opinion-policy link at the national level might thus be weaker
in countries with federal systems. Similarly, the representation of public opinion in national
policy that is not affected by EU legislation is likely to be lower in countries that are
members of the EU, since the division of competences between the EU and the national
level is not always clear-cut. The blurring of responsibilities may thus act as a strain on
responsiveness not only in EU policy making itself (Alexandrova et al. 2016) but also in
the spheres of national policy making analysed here. As a result, it can be expected that the
opinion-policy linkage is weaker in countries which have a federal, as opposed to a unitary,
system and in countries that are members of the EU.
Data and method
In order to investigate the link between public opinion and policy, we collected public
opinion data and mapped policy for 20 policy issues in 31 European countries.4 Our
unit of analysis is a policy in a country. Since we aimed at analysing the same policy
issues across countries, we systematically screened a set of cross-national public opinion
surveys conducted among representative samples in at least 15 European countries, such
as the Eurobarometer, European Social Survey and European Election Study, to single
out questions about respondents’ preferences concerning speciic policy issues.We selected
20 items in the period between 1998 and 2013 that cover a broad range of different policy
areas, including, among others, economic, health, defence and retirement policy, and which
met our selection criteria. These criteria included, among others, that an item referred to
a speciic policy issue rather than a broad policy area (e.g., smoking bans in bars and pubs
rather than health policy; military involvement in Afghanistan rather than defence policy)
with national competence, that the response scale indicated respondents’ agreement or
disagreement, and that it was possible to determine whether the policy was in place when
the survey was conducted (i.e., questions asking about preferences for future changes in
policy were excluded).5 The 20 policy issues, together with the year, the survey and the
number of countries in which the itemwas asked, are listed in theAppendix at the end of the
article.
Although the set of policies covers a diverse range of policy areas, it does not constitute
a random sample from the universe of policy issues. This universe is extremely dificult
to deine, and so far Burstein’s (2014) is the only study of public opinion and policy
that attempts it. Yet, while Burstein’s interpretation of the set of all bills introduced in
Congress as the universe of potential policies may be valid in the United States, it is not
easily transferrable to the European context. In many European countries, governments
have traditionally initiated the majority of laws and these proposals often have a high
chance of being adopted (Andeweg & Nijzink 1995). Thus, information about potential
policies with low chances of adoption is dificult to acquire. Furthermore, it would be
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virtually impossible to obtain public opinion data on a randomly selected sample of policy
issues for a large number of countries. Selecting policy issues based on their availability
in surveys is thus the best viable method for the moment for a cross-national study
as ours.
While there is certainly a risk that the results obtained on the basis of our sample cannot
be generalised to other policy issues, this risk should be relatively low for several reasons.
First, the issues cover a range of policy areas. Second, they vary strongly in salience, which
has been shown to be an important predictor of the opinion-policy link (Lax & Phillips
2012;Monroe 1998; Page & Shapiro 1983). Third, it is unlikely that the sample is biased due
to an underlying logic that guides the inclusion of items in the surveys, as we rely on many
different surveys. Moreover, this point is more relevant with respect to national surveys,
where the selection of questions may be driven by current policy debates.While this may be
the case for some of our policies, such as military involvement in Afghanistan, it is unlikely
to be the case for many of them.6
Measuring policy and public opinion
After selecting the policy issues, we mapped the state of public policy in the countries
included at the time when the survey was conducted. Information was obtained from relevant
documents issued by government agencies, international organisations, nongovernmental
organisations,news outlets and academics.We irst coded the policy status for each issue into
an ordinal scale with the number of levels relecting the potential variation in policy. These
scaleswere then transformed into a harmonised scalewith three levels,where 0 indicates that
the policy was not in place, 1 that it was partly in place and 2 that it was fully in place. As an
example, the scale for the smoking ban in bars and pubs relects the differences in smoking
regulation across Europe: 0 = no ban, 1 = partial ban with many or some exceptions (e.g.,
for small premises or smoking rooms) and 2 = complete ban.
This ordinal measure of policy is used as the dependent variable in the analysis of the
relationship between degrees of policy and public support. To analyse whether an increase
in public support for a policy is related to a higher probability of the policy being in place,
the policy measure is regressed on a variable that indicates the proportion of respondents
in a country who were in favour of the policy among those who indicated a preference in
favour or against it.7 In order to test the hypothesised effects on the relationship between
public opinion and policy, we interact public opinion with the respective variable.
In a second step, we investigate opinion-policy congruence. This is operationalised as a
dummy variable indicating whether policy was in line with the preferences of the majority
of the citizens who expressed an opinion. In order to construct this variable, the original
ordinal policy scales were collapsed into two categories: ‘policy in place’ or ‘no policy in
place’. The policies coded as ‘partly in place’ were recoded as either ‘in place’ or ‘not in
place’ depending on the particular issue, as shown in Online Appendix B, which provides
information on the original scales and their transformation into the three-level and binary
measures. The resulting congruence variable is dichotomous and takes the value 1 if (a) the
policy is in place and themajority of the public is in favour or (b) the policy is not in place and
the majority of the public is against it. Descriptive information about policy, public opinion
and congruence can be found in Online Appendix C.
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Independent variables
The independent variables in our study are a range of indicators of the political institutions
whose effects we seek to analyse. In line with Wlezien and Soroka (2012), we measure
the proportionality of the electoral system by using the effective number of parliamentary
parties (ENPP), developed by Golder (2010) and extended by Bormann and Golder
(2013). We use the value from the last national election that took place prior to the year
in which the public opinion data was collected.8 Next, we use two alternative measures
of the executive-legislative balance. The irst is a set of three regime type dummies
indicating whether a country has a presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary system
(Cheibub et al. 2010).9 We also use a more nuanced index of the legislature’s inluence
over the executive, drawn from the Parliamentary Powers Index (Fish & Kroenig 2009).
Its components are seven dimensions of the national legislature’s power – for instance,
whether it can by itself impeach the president or replace the prime minister. It ranges from
0 to 9, with higher values indicating stronger inluence. Our third measure of the horizontal
division of powers is a dummy indicating whether a legislature is unicameral or has two
chambers.
Finally, we measure the vertical division of powers with two variables: the irst indicates
whether a country was a member of the European Union when public opinion and
policy were measured and the second whether the country was unitary or federal or
had a hybrid structure in which some central government powers were delegated to the
regional level. The sources of all variables and each country’s values are listed in Online
Appendix D.
Moreover, we control for the media salience of an issue, since the existing literature
provides evidence that it strengthens the link between opinion and policy (e.g., Lax &
Phillips 2012). If a policy issue is salient in the public debate, and particularly in the news
media, the public will have access to more information in order to form policy preferences.
In turn, political decision makers will receive more information about public opinion on
salient issues on which they can base their decisions. The heightened visibility of and public
attentiveness to policy makers’ (in-)actions on these issues may also increase the pressure
on them to be responsive or to convince the public of their policies (cf., e.g., Page & Shapiro
1983).Wemeasuremedia salience through the proportion of articles in the Financial Times’s
coverage of Europe devoted to the policy issue over a three-year period, ending in the
year in which the survey was conducted. Since most issues had very few articles devoted
to them while a few were extremely salient (especially nuclear energy), we use the natural
logarithm of the measure. The Financial Times certainly does not pay equal attention to the
public and political debates in all European countries. However, in light of the dificulty of
collecting data on the salience of the speciic policy issues within each country, we believe
that it constitutes a suficiently valid proxy of the relative salience of the policy issues across
countries. In addition, it can be argued that even if it were possible to measure media
coverage of all 20 issues in the 31 European countries, such a measure would be endogenous
to policy adoption as issues would be more salient where they were on the government
agenda (Lax & Phillips 2012).10
We nevertheless construct an alternative measure to test the robustness of the results.
This is an indicator of public rather thanmedia salience and is based on respondents’ answers
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to the ‘most important problem’ (MIP) question posed by the European Election Study in
each country. This measure is problematic, however, in that it links the speciic policy issues
in our sample to the very broad policy areas into which the responses are categorised. It is
thus not a good indicator of the salience of the speciic policy issue (e.g., respondents might
consider the environment to be an important issue but not speciically whether plastic waste
should be banned from landills). Moreover, it does not indicate the degree of information
transmission between the public and policy makers through the media, which is a crucial
aspect of the causal mechanisms we proposed.We therefore use themedia salience indicator
in the models reported but provide details about the construction of the MIP measure and
estimates of the models in Online Appendix F.
In the congruence models, we also include a measure of the size of the opinion majority,
whether in favour or against the policy (Lax& Phillips 2012). It accounts for the expectation
that policy is more likely to be line with the majority of the public, the larger the majority.
Finally, we include the year in which public opinion and policy were measured in order to
control for a potential time trend in the opinion-policy link as well as the fact that the more
recent surveys tend to includemoreCentral andEasternEuropean countries.All continuous
independent variables are grand-mean centred.
Results
The relationship between opinion and policy in Europe
Our cases are clustered within both policy issues and countries. In order to determine
whether there are dependencies between the cases within a cluster for which we should
account in our models, we irst estimated multilevel ordered logit regression models with
policy as the dependent variable and public opinion as the only independent variable.11
In model 1, Table 1, we report the random variances of the intercept and the slope of
public opinion at the level of policy issues. First of all, we ind that public support for a
policy is statistically signiicantly associated with the probability of the policy being in place.
Second, this relationship varies systematically across policy issues, as the random slope
variance suggests. Figure 1 illustrates this variation by showing the predicted coeficients
of public opinion on policy for each issue when we allow the slope for public opinion to
vary between issues. On some issues, including ‘military in Afghanistan’ and ‘adoption by
same-sex couples’, policy is clearly more strongly related to public opinion than on other
issues, such as ‘ban on plastic waste in landills’, where the relationship is in fact negative.We
obtain a signiicant likelihood-ratio test comparing the model to an ordered logit regression
without the random intercept and slope, which shows that the multilevel model with issues
at the higher level has a signiicantly better it.
In model 2, we estimate the equivalent model with countries at the higher level and
ind that the slope variance is close to zero when we allow the relationship between
public opinion and policy to vary between countries. This means that, as Figure 2 shows,
the predicted coeficients of public opinion on policy are very similar across countries.
The likelihood-ratio test comparing model 2 to the equivalent model without the random
variance components is insigniicant.12 In substantive terms, this means that there seems to
be very little variation in the strength of the opinion-policy linkage across countries.13
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Table 1. Effects on the relationship between public opinion and policy
Model
1 2 3 4
Public opinion (PO) 4.91 (1.81)** 2.62 (.42)*** 5.51 (2.67)* 4.18 (2.64)
Electoral system measure (ENPP) –0.11 (0.08) –0.08 (0.09)
PO*ENPP 0.26 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47)
Regime type (Ref.= Parliamentary)
Semi-presidential 0.23 (0.24)
Presidential –0.04 (0.55)
PO*Semi-presidential –1.03 (1.20)
PO*Presidential –2.48 (2.36)
Legislature’s inluence –0.12 (0.07)
PO*Legislature’s inluence –0.00 (0.34)
Bicameralism 0.05 (0.26) 0.18 (0.26)
PO*Bicameralism –0.41 (1.35) –0.26 (1.38)
Federalism (Ref.= Unitary)
Hybrid 0.36 (0.33) 0.40 (0.33)
Federal 0.02 (0.36) –0.02 (0.35)
PO*Hybrid 1.78 (1.62) 1.73 (1.61)
PO*Federal 2.67 (1.81) 2.34 (1.78)
EU member 0.10 (0.43) 0.15 (0.44)
PO*EU member 0.58 (2.11) 1.85 (2.18)
Salience 0.43 (0.22) 0.47 (0.22)*
PO*Salience 1.65 (0.93) 1.35 (0.89)
Year 0.11 (0.10) 0.11 (0.10)
PO*Year –1.14 (0.49)* –1.20 (0.47)*
Issue intercept variance 3.30 (1.37) 2.46 (1.05) 2.37 (1.01)
Issue PO slope variance 43.98 (24.84) 32.59 (18.88) 27.19 (17.59)
Country intercept variance 0.93 (0.00)
Country PO slope variance 0.01 (0.00)
Intercept-slope covariance 4.25 (4.29) 0.08 (0.00) 3.29 (3.47) 4.01 (3.27)
Deviance 770 1035 745 688
N level 1 (level 2) 491 (20) 491 (31) 491 (20) 457 (20)
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Despite this observation, we might ind that the opinion-policy relationship varies with
political institutions when we control for the other institutions. In model 3, we test this by
including interaction terms of each institutional indicator with the public opinion variable.
We ind that none of the institutions inluences the relationship between public opinion
and policy. This holds even when only including one indicator at a time (not shown). Only
the control measure for the year signiicantly interacts with public opinion, suggesting that
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Figure 1. Predicted coeficients (log-odds) of public opinion on the policy being in place for each issue, with
95 per cent conidence intervals.
Notes: The dashed line indicates the mean coeficient across all issues. Coeficients are empirical Bayes
predictions based on the coeficient of public opinion and its random slope variance in model 1, Table 1.
the opinion-policy link has become weaker over time. This might, however, be due to the
expansion of the country sample.
Model 4 is equivalent to model 3 but includes the measure of the legislature’s inluence
instead of the regime type dummies.This variable does not seem to inluence the relationship
between opinion and policy either.14 As a robustness check, we estimated a set of models
equivalent to those in Table 1 but with a binary measure of policy (the one used to construct
the congruencemeasure) and amultilevel logit speciication.The results do not substantially
differ except that the interaction term between public opinion andmedia salience is positive
and signiicant at p < 0.05.15
Explaining public opinion-policy congruence in Europe
While it is reassuring that the likelihood of having a particular policy rises with public
support, this is not a suficient standard for policy to relect the views of the citizens. We
therefore examine to what extent existing policy is in line with the preferences of the
majority and whether political institutions inluence it. We ind that in the majority (63 per
cent) of cases, legislation is in line with the opinion of the majority of citizens (Table 2). A
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Figure 2. Predicted coeficients (log-odds) of public opinion on the policy being in place for each country,
with 95 per cent conidence intervals.
Notes: The dashed line indicates the mean coeficient. Coeficients are empirical Bayes predictions based on
the coeficient of public opinion and its random slope variance in model 2, Table 3.
comparable study by Lax and Philips (2012) on the American states found congruence only
about half of the time. While Table 2 shows that congruence varies across countries (from
41 per cent of issues in Italy and Poland to 100 per cent in Iceland, which is however an
outlier and for which we have information on only a small number of issues), the differences
across issues are again more striking: in only 7 per cent of countries is the law on warnings
on alcohol bottles directed at drivers and pregnant women congruent with public opinion,
whereas congruence exists in 100 per cent of the countries for military involvement in
Afghanistan. Figure 3 underlines that there are no clear patterns in congruence with regard
to the different regions in Europe.
This observation is conirmed by the results of multilevel logistic regression analyses
with random intercepts at the levels of issues and countries, respectively (Table 3). While
a substantial degree of variation in congruence can be accounted for by policy issues
(model 5), a negligible share of it is related to countries (model 6), mirroring our indings
in the analysis of the opinion-policy relationship. Thus, even though there is clearly some
degree of variation in congruence across countries, as Table 2 shows, it does not appear to
be systematic. It would therefore appear that countries’ institutional conigurations have
no net impact on whether policy corresponds with the majority opinion. However, in order
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Table 2. Congruence by country and policy issue
Country
Congruence in
% (number of
issues) Issue
Congruence in
% (number of
countries)
Iceland 100 (4) Military involvement in Afghanistan 100 (15)
Portugal 85 (20) Progressive income tax 94 (16)
Estonia 77 (13) Nationwide minimum wage 89 (27)
Romania 77 (13) State support for caregivers 86 (28)
France 75 (20) Embryonic stem cell research 81 (31)
Sweden 75 (20) Nuclear power 81 (27)
Austria 74 (19) Adoption of children by same-sex couples 77 (31)
Greece 71 (17) Ban of tobacco sale through vending machines 74 (27)
Hungary 71 (17) Abortion 74 (27)
Malta 69 (13) Smoking ban in bars and pubs 68 (28)
Netherlands 68 (19) Same-sex marriage 63 (27)
Slovakia 67 (15) Detaining terrorist suspects without charge 56 (18)
Cyprus 64 (14) Right to earn an income while receiving a
pension
56 (16)
Denmark 63 (19) Mandatory retirement age 53 (30)
Finland 63 (19) Experiments on animals like monkeys and dogs 52 (31)
Lithuania 62 (13) Online voting 44 (16)
Bulgaria 60 (15) Ius soli (citizenship on the basis of birth in a
territory)
40 (20)
Germany 60 (20) Asylum seekers’ right to work 38 (21)
Spain 60 (20) Ban of plastic waste disposal in landills 21 (28)
Luxembourg 59 (17) Warnings on alcoholic drink bottles 7 (27)
Croatia 57 (7)
Latvia 56 (16)
Norway 55 (11)
United Kingdom 55 (20)
Belgium 53 (17)
Slovenia 53 (17)
Switzerland 50 (6)
Czech Republic 47 (17)
Ireland 47 (19)
Italy 41 (17)
Poland 41 (17)
Total 63 (20) 63 (31)
to test whether individual political institutions affect it we again need to control for the
others.
As models 7 and 8 show, none of them do except one: countries with a bicameral
system have a lower likelihood of opinion-policy congruence than countries with only one
legislative chamber. This inding suggests that the checks and balances present in bicameral
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Figure 3. Congruence levels across Europe.
Notes: Darker shades indicate higher opinion-policy congruence (cf. Table 2). The mean level is 63 per cent
(Denmark and Finland), the minimum is 41 per cent (Italy and Poland) and the maximum is 100 per cent
(Iceland).
systems might make it more dificult for governments to provide the policies that the
public wants. The average predicted probability of congruence (based on model 8), with the
covariates at their observed levels, is 69 per cent in unicameral systems, whereas it is only
57 per cent in bicameral systems.We also ind that policy is more likely to relect the opinion
of the majority of the public the larger the majority; this corresponds with the inding that
the likelihood of policy being enacted (not enacted) is correlated with the degree of support
in favour of (against) it. Finally, congruence is more likely the more salient a policy issue is
in the news media.16
Conclusion
Whereas the quality of democratic governance in Europe and elsewhere has been subject
to much criticism, our study inds a positive, large and statistically signiicant association
between public opinion and policy on a range of issues across the European continent.
Moreover, in close to two-thirds of all cases policy is congruent with the majority opinion.
Even though democratic politics is about more than the extent to which policies on speciic
issues relect the wishes of the public, these results offer reassurance regarding the state of
democratic governance in Europe. They indicate that the political institutions and practices
C© 2018TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd.on behalf ofEuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
16 ANNE RASMUSSEN, STEFANIE REHER & DIMITER TOSHKOV
Table 3. Effects on public opinion-policy congruence
Model
5 6 7 8
Opinion majority 3.48 (1.08)** 3.90 (1.14)***
Electoral system measure (ENPP) –0.10 (0.08) –0.11 (0.08)
Regime type (Ref.= Parliamentary)
Semi-presidential 0.34 (0.24)
Presidential –0.11 (0.56)
Legislature’s inluence –0.14 (0.08)
Bicameralism –0.74 (0.26)** –0.66 (0.27)*
Federalism (Ref.= Unitary)
Hybrid 0.36 (0.34) 0.32 (0.33)
Federal 0.62 (0.36) 0.58 (0.35)
EU member 0.53 (0.41) 0.81 (0.43)
Salience 0.49 (0.14)*** 0.48 (0.15)**
Year –0.09 (0.07) –0.09 (0.07)
Intercept 0.63 (0.28)* 0.51 (0.09)*** 0.33 (0.46) 0.18 (0.47)
Issue intercept variance 1.31 (0.55) 0.95 (0.42) 1.06 (0.47)
Country intercept variance 0.00 (0.00)
Deviance 582 650 547 505
N level 1 (level 2) 491 (20) 491 (31) 491 (20) 457 (20)
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
in place are able to ensure, one way or another, that public opinion and policy do not deviate
too much and too often from one another.
Importantly, we do not ind systematic variation across the 31 countries we study in
the extent to which policy is correlated with public preferences or in the likelihood of
congruence between opinion and policy. In contrast, we ind signiicant differences in
policy representation across the 20 policy issues that we study, which are only partly
accounted for by the differences in overall media salience between the issues. The low
country-level variation in the opinion-policy link is intriguing because our sample of
countries features both established and relatively young democracies from all corners
of the European continent – from Norway to Portugal and from Ireland to Bulgaria.
These countries display a lot of variation in terms of political institutions, which are often
assumed to have important effects on the opinion-policy link.Yet, apart from a relationship
between the number of legislative chambers and congruence between policy and the
majority opinion, we did not ind evidence that institutions condition the opinion-policy
linkage.
While there is increasing agreement that different electoral rules can generate high levels
of left-right congruence between the government and the citizens (Golder & Lloyd 2014;
Blais & Bodet 2006; Ferland 2016; Powell 2009), our results suggest that the policies in place
also relect public opinion to similar degrees in more and less proportional electoral systems.
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It thus appears that the factors that might obstruct responsive policy making in PR systems,
such as the need to bargain, veto points and a low clarity of responsibility in multi-party
governments, are balanced out by incentives to cater to speciic constituencies rather than
the median voter and other potential factors in majoritarian systems.
Moreover, in systems where the legislature has more power over the executive, this
presence of a veto player might hinder policy change that responds to public opinion, but at
the same time it can prevent unpopular policies. Whether the public prefers policy change
or the status quo might thus be decisive, and on the aggregate these dynamics might cancel
each other out.Surprisingly,even the vertical division of powers does not appear to affect the
opinion-policy linkage, although we expected that governments in countries with multilevel
structures, and hence a lower clarity of responsibility, would have lower incentives to bring
policy and public opinion in line. We thus conclude that policy may be in line with public
opinion in a variety of different institutional contexts. Yet, this certainly does not mean
that the quality of democracy does not vary across Europe. Even though correspondence
between public opinion and policy is an important aspect of representative democracy, it is
not suficient if the procedural aspects of the democratic political process are not respected.
Our results indicate that at any given point of time there might be no net differences
in the aggregate opinion-policy linkage and congruence between countries with different
institutions.Hence, while the institutions might have various well-deined effects, the results
of their operationmight not be different,on average, in the sample of countries that we have.
It should also be acknowledged that institutions that produce year-to-year relationships
between opinion and policy are not necessarily the same as institutions that co-occur with
concurrent opinion-policy correspondence analysed in this study. Future research should
therefore investigate the causes of the differences in opinion-policy linkage between issues
as well as the patterns and relationships we observed in more detail – for example, by
analysing whether and how institutions and issue characteristics inluence the different
causal links between opinion and policy. Longitudinal research designs and in-depth case
studies searching for direct evidence of policy makers listening to the public and the
public adjusting its preferences to policy have great potential to address such questions
(Rasmussen et al. 2018). Importantly, such work could also consider whether not only
individual institutions but also speciic conigurations of institutions affect the linkage
between opinion and policy.
Moreover, it should be recognised that, beyond the dificulty of measuring comparative
institutions, it is possible that the mechanisms through which institutional and issue
characteristics inluence this linkage vary between subsets of countries and issues. For
instance, in countries where an institution has become consolidated and exerted its
effects over many years, its potential to link opinion and policy might be different
than in newly established democracies or countries where institutional changes took
place recently. The fact that our sample is inclusive in terms of both issues and
countries might also partly explain why our indings differ from those of some previous
studies. Wlezien and Soroka (2012), for instance, who ind effects of electoral system
proportionality and executive power, include a smaller number of postcommunist countries.
It is also possible that because we look further down the policy-making process than,
for example, work that looks at agenda responsiveness, more institutional mechanisms
may come into play and neutralise each other. Future research aiming at disentangling
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the potential countervailing effects of institutions should take such contingencies into
consideration.
Acknowledgements
Our research received inancial support from Sapere Aude Grant 0602-02642B from the
Danish Council for Independent Research and VIDI Grant 452-12-008 from the Dutch
NWO. We received excellent comments on earlier versions of this article from Phillipp
Genschel,FrederikHjorth,Will Jennings,Ann-Kristin Kölln,LarsMäder and ChrisWlezien
as well as from the participants at the annual meetings of the European Political Science
Association and theAmerican Political ScienceAssociation in 2015.We are also grateful for
comments received during the workshop ‘Beyond the Democratic Deicit’ at the European
University Institute, 14–15 May 2015; the workshop ‘Responsiveness: Identifying New
Research Focuses and Methods’, 26 May 2015 in Gothenburg; and the SPS Departmental
Seminar at the EUI on 24 April 2017. Finally, we are grateful for the efforts which Cæcilie
Venzel Nielsen and several other student assistants put into coding our data.
Appendix: Policy issues, year, survey and number of countries covered
Policy issue Year Survey
Number of
countries
Warnings on alcoholic drink bottles directed at
pregnant women and drivers
2009 EB 72.3 27
Experiments on animals like monkeys and dogs 2010 EB 73.1 31
Smoking bans in bars and pubs 2008 Flash EB 253 28
Banning of tobacco sale through vending machines 2012 EB 77.1 27
Embryonic stem cell research 2010 EB 73.1 31
Nuclear power 2008 EB 69.1 27
Nationwide minimum wage 2010 EB 74.1 27
State support for caregivers 2007 EB 67.3 28
Detaining terrorist suspects without charge 2005–2008 ISSP 2006 18
Same-sex marriage 2009 EES 2009 27
Adoption of children by same-sex couples 2008–2009 EVS 4 31
Abortion 2009 EES 2009 27
Ius soli (citizenship on the basis of birth in a territory) 2003–2005 ISSP 2003 20
Progressive income tax 1998–2001 ISSP 1999 16
Right to earn an income while receiving a pension 2001 EB 56.1 16
Asylum seekers’ right to work 2002–2003 ESS 1 21
Online voting 2001 EB 54.2 16
Military involvement in Afghanistan 2001 Flash EB 114 15
Mandatory retirement age 2011 EB 76.2 30
Ban of disposal of plastic waste in landills 2013 Flash EB 388 28
Notes: EB = Eurobarometer; ISSP = International Social Survey Programme; EES = European Election
Study; EVS = European Values Study; ESS = European Social Survey.
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Notes
1. Brooks (1985) is an exception to this pattern and includes information about opinion and policy on
speciic issues in three countries.
2. Online Appendix A illustrates that the degree to which a change in public support for a policy is
associatedwith a change in the likelihood of the policy being in place is not linearly related to congruence
between opinion and policy.
3. It should be noted, however, that electoral system characteristics other than the degree of
proportionality, such as intra-party competition, also play important roles (see, e.g., Carey & Shugart
1995; Golden 2003; Hicken & Simmons 2008).
4. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom. For some policy issues, we only have data for a subset of these countries.
5. Further details about the selection and coding of policy items can be obtained upon request from the
authors.
6. For the variety of ways through which questions make it into the Eurobarometer surveys, see Haverland
et al. (2018).
7. Respondents who answered ‘don’t know’ or indicated neither a preference for nor against the policy
were excluded, since including them when calculating the proportion is equivalent to inappropriately
including them in the proportion that is against the policy. The average proportion of respondents in
these categories is below 10 per cent.
8. The effective number of parties provides a more ine-grainedmeasure of the proportionality of electoral
systems than a binary or ordinal categorisation. However, we also estimated the models with a dummy
variable indicating whether the main system used for lower house elections is based on plurality or
PR rules, with the Gallagher Index, which measures the vote-seat disproportionality, and with the
average district magnitude. The results are reported in Online Appendix E and do not substantially
differ.
9. Note that in our European sample there is no strong presidential system like the United States, with
the possible exception of Cyprus. Cheibub et al. (2010) classify Switzerland as a presidential system
because the executive cannot be removed by the legislature through a vote of no-conidence. However,
since its executive is not popularly elected but emerges from its legislature, Switzerland is often not
considered a presidential system (e.g., Samuels & Shugart 2010). This issue is accounted for through the
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measure of the legislature’s inluence over the executive.Moreover,when estimating themodels without
Switzerland, the coeficients of the regime type measure remain statistically insigniicant.
10. We also use an alternative indicator based on the Financial Times data which uses the ranking of the
issues based on their salience. It is strongly correlated with the measure used in the analysis (Pearson’s
r = 0.98, p < 0.0005) and yields almost identical estimates.
11. Ordered logit models rest on the assumption that the regression lines for the different outcomes are
parallel. While we cannot test this assumption within the multilevel framework, we estimated a single-
level ordered logit model equivalent to models 1 and 2 and conducted a Brant test, which indicated that
the parallel lines assumption is not violated.
12. Due to lack of variation between countries, we do not present a cross-classiied model with random
intercepts for both policy issues and countries. A robustness check with such a model yields indings in
line with those presented.
13. Since our sample has more countries than issues, we checked whether this might account for the fact
that we ind greater variation across issues than across countries. We sampled 20 countries randomly
from the full set of observations, re-estimated the models and repeated the process 50 times. In only
a negligible fraction of these models, cross-country variation was found signiicant, while cross-issue
variation remained so.This implies that our results are not driven by the different numbers of issues and
countries in our data.
14. The statistically insigniicant interaction terms indicate that the relationship between public opinion
and policy does not signiicantly differ between different values on the institution variables. However,
it might nevertheless be the case that the relationship is statistically signiicantly different from zero at
some, but not other, values of the institution variables. We plot the average marginal effects of opinion
on policy along the range of each institution measure in Online Appendix G. The relationship remains
statistically signiicant and at similar levels throughout, except at very high values of theGallagher Index
and in presidential systems,where the coeficients are smaller and statistically insigniicant, whereby the
latter appears to be due to low numbers of observations.
15. The mixed-effect models presented here exploit the between-country variation in institutions present
in our dataset. We also estimated equivalent models with country ixed effects displayed in Online
Appendix H, which also indicate that the opinion-policy relationship does not vary with institutional
differences.
16. This effect is in line with the effect of salience we found in our robustness check using a dichotomous
rather than an ordinal measure of policy as the dependent variable. That we ind different effects of
salience in Tables 1 and 3 should not surprise us since even though ‘congruence with majority opinion’
and ‘the relationship between opinion and policy’ are related concepts, they measure different elements
of the opinion-policy linkage (cf. Online Appendix A). The estimates of models using the alternative
electoral system measures are provided in Online Appendix E. We also estimated a logistic regression
model with country ixed effects, which includes the institutions with within-country variation from
models 7 and 8 – namely ENPP and EUmembership (Online Appendix H).Here, congruence increases
signiicantly with EU membership. The results of the congruence analysis in Table 3 and in Online
Appendix E are robust to excluding the opinion majority measure, which could be relevant if certain
institutional set-ups were more conducive to larger opinion majorities (see Online Appendix J). The
results also hold when only one predictor at a time is included (not shown).
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